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INTRODUCTION
The old order of kinship and social class in Europe broke apart during
the nineteenth century. Two revolutions gave the final blow: mass
democracy and industrialism. Together, these explosive forces reversed
the direction of Western society on the Continent and in North America.
The political revolution in France and the Industrial Revolution in
Great Britain and the United States shifted the course of history around
the North Atlantic. Presently, another revolution equal in power is
reshaping the social contours. Past revolutions highlight the transfor-
mation taking place now: a cultural metamorphosis comparable in
importance to mass democracy and technological industry one century
earlier. The years may not appear as volatile, but the present modifi-
cations in our social structure are as extensive and substantial as those
of the 1800s.
A DUALITY
How shall this contemporary phenomenon be labelled? Post-indus-
trialism? A communications revolution? The information age? Telemat-
ics? A paperless society?
Such designations are insufficient. Unique to the modern day is
global technology on a worldwide scale, and the two most decisive are
in fundamental contradiction. Information technology has created global
communication networks that potentially involve us all in each other's
business. But its opposite, military technology, threatens the human race
with annihilation. Today's global age has the technological sophistication
dialectically to destroy all humanity while simultaneously binding all
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nations into a worldwide information network. Since imminent destruc-
tion is now a possibility, scholarship in information ethics needs an
urgency about it unlike any previous theorizing. Principial claims must
henceforth embrace the needs of the entire human race within their
purview.
1945: Nuclear technology, in principle, is now able to totalize the
planet. 1957: Sputnik rockets into space, but not merely as a satellite
fired from the U.S.S.R. in secret; the whole world is watching. The late
Marshall McLuhan (1974) noted that Sputnik bound together human-
kind for the first time electronically. Lincoln's assassination took months
to reach the London streets; a century later, Russian technology was
paraded instantly before an admiring world. November 1963: The
world participates as one in President Kennedy's funeral. Television,
radio, and satellites gather us around the casket with all the emotion
and ceremony of every burial. The parade down Pennsylvania Avenue
occurs on Main Street, the World.
Since those heady days, Earth's orbits are loaded with satellites of
information and for military deployment. In era number three, global
technology stands in counterpoint: As information is increased, facili-
tation of global understanding is presumed. When the nuclear arms
race is successfully curbed, these two technologies are put on the proper
trajectory. Open information unfettered globally and destructive tech-
nology restrained politically yields a working formula for sustaining the
globe at this auspicious moment of human history, although the rela-
tionship between improved information and decreased danger is porous
at best.
That, in sanitized form, is the San Andreas fault line on which our
technological civilization rests. But the problem is slightly more com-
plicated.
Jacques Ellul (1981) developed the argument that the technological
phenomenon is decisive, though not exclusive, in defining twentieth-
century culture. As an explanatory element, it plays the part of capital
in Marx's interpretation of the nineteenth century. This does not mean
that technology has the same function as capital nor that the capitalist
system is a thing of the past. It still exists, but capital no longer fulfills
the role Marx claimed for it. Whereas work produces value for him, in
industrially condensed societies the determining factor is technology.
This creates value now and is not peculiar to capitalism. The characters
have changed. Society can no longer be divided into capitalists and
workers; the phenomenon is completely different and more abstract.
Technological systems are now on one side and all humanity is on the
other, the former driven by necessity and the human demand for
freedom. Ellul concludes that the world in which we live must be read,
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not in terms of political-economic structures, but in terms of technology
(ch. 2). While this analysis privileges the industrial order, even that
three-fourths of the world which is not yet technological finds itself
defined within technological parameters.
Thus the bipolar model needs to be restated. Global technologies
of communications and extinction have given the present age its peculiar
resonance; but the fundamental issue is the technological artifice within
these boundaries which now defines the human habitat. The revolution
today is that the world has entered a technological civilization. Tech-
nology is not merely one more arena for philosophers and sociologists K"'
to investigate, but a new foundation for understanding the self, human
institutions, and ultimate reality. A society is technological, Ellul argues,
not because of its machines, but from the pursuit of "machineness" in
every area of human endeavor. Mechanistic techniques are applied not
just to nature, but to social organizations and one's understanding of
personhood. A technological society with global parameters separates
itself from previous ones, including industrial civilizations, "through its
historical consciousness that society is not fixed and given with the order
of nature, but is an artificial human creation" (Fasching, n.d.). In this
sense, finding an orientation in a technological civilization is fundamen-
tally a religious problem. Unable to establish a meaningful existence
outside the artificial ambience of a technological culture, human beings
place their ultimate hope in it. Seeing no other source of security and
failing to recognize the illusoriness of their technological freedom, they
become slaves to the exacting determinations of efficiency.
Whereas previous social orders operated with a triad humans/
tools/nature in technological societies, nature recedes and humans
perceive themselves as living in a technical artifice, existing not in nature
but in culture.
Man does not any longer live in a natural environment but rather
in a milieu composed of the products of his technology. . . . He can
no longer take any significant action without technological inter-
mediation. Technology constitutes an engulfing universe for man,
who finds himself in it as in a cocoon. (Ellul, 1978, p. 216)
Our symbolic formations, or cultures, are now dominated by
technological structures. In Ellul's framework, communications media
represent the meaning-edge of the technological system, the arena where
the latter's soul is most clearly exposed. Though exhibiting the structural
elements of all technical artifacts, their particular identity as a technology
inheres in their function as bearers of symbols. Information technologies
thus incarnate the properties of technology while serving as agents for
interpreting the meaning of the very phenomenon they embody. Ellul
(1969) calls our communication systems the "innermost, and most elusive
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manifestation" of human technological activity (p. xvii). All artifacts
communicate meaning in an important sense, but media instruments
carry this role exclusively. As the media sketch out our world, organize
our conversations, determine our decisions, and influence our self-
identity, they do so with a technological cadence, massaging in our souls
a technological rhythm and predisposition.
Over the centuries, in Western scholarship at least, ethicists could
take divine command theories seriously or, at a minimum, presume
various versions of Platonic absolutes. Even as these presumptions
unraveled in the nineteenth century, the immutability of nature, which
took care of itself and demonstrated physical permanence, made norms
of semi-enduring status at least imaginable. In other words, all previous
ethics reckoned only with noncumulative phenomena, directly or indi-
rectly. Morality could conceivably be the property of all, living as
humanity did on terra firma before the face of an Eternal Being, or at
least with a first principle that ordered the vacillations of everyday
affairs. But as Jacques Ellul, Ivan Illich and others have demonstrated,
a technological age is cumulative, expanding, and augmentative. There-
fore, while endeavoring to form a new order of world understanding
through communications, one can simultaneously augment an artifice
where traditional ethical principles carry no resonance.
In his celebrated book, The Imperative of Responsibility, Hans Jonas
(1984) contends that today's ominous trends demand an entirely new
ethics: "Modern technology has introduced actions of such novel scale,
objects and consequences that the framework of former ethics can no
longer contain them" (p. 6). Jonas calls for a brawny, long-range ethics
commensurate with the extent of contemporary technological power.
But this presentation is not intended merely as a reprieve from minuscule
ethics. It takes Jonas' ideas full strength and resonates in somber tones
about the formidability of his challenge.
Conferences such as this are a priceless resource in a complicated
age. It is a hopeful sign that the same academic unit sponsoring the
Artificial Intelligence and Expert Systems (Lancaster & Smith, in press)
conference also organized this seminar on ethics. Professionals in infor-
mation storage and transmission face a firestorm of issues at present,
and there are many impacted levels on which a sophisticated library
system operates today. Developing a library profession with integrity is
akin to building a home in a hurricane: the roof can never be safely
put in place given the whirlwind of demands and unending technological
innovations. And while a nine-session, two-day conference can help to
hammer out policy guidelines, get the ethical problems straight, and
stimulate each other's moral imagination, the larger context within
which we work is determined by the contours of the technological
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civilization sketched above. It is essential that professional ethics
whether of librarians, journalists, engineers, doctors, or lawyers be
integrated into the common morality. Information ethics will prosper
to the degree professional ethics as a whole develops a substantive and
generative framework. Information professionals work in a fortuitous
area that represents the quintessence of several axial issues at present,
and are in a golden position to contribute to the debates in social ethics
generally.
With praise to those who are lighting the proverbial candle rather
than cursing the darkness, the author will describe the heavy clouds
nonetheless trusting that those in ethics for the long haul will use the
seminal work this week to help unravel a conundrum and a paradox
which makes our task in applied ethics nearly intractable.
A CONUNDRUM
In their commonplaces, industrialized countries presume that tech-
nology is merely a tool open to proper or improper use. As Oxford's
R. A. Buchanan (1965) has written, "Technology is essentially amoral,
a thing apart from values, an instrument which can be used for good
or ill" (p. 163). A knife in a surgeon's hand saves a life and destroys it
when used by a murderer. The same projector shows pornography and
National Geographic specials. One is reminded of the familiar slogan,
"Guns don't kill people, people do." In Swedish Lapland, snowmobiles
are used for reindeer herding, among Canada's Eskimos for trapping,
and in Wisconsin for leisure. Technological products are supposedly
neutral and independent; they can support completely different cultures
and lifestyles.
The presumption of neutrality has been very costly. It leads to an
exaggerated, unbalanced emphasis on magnitude, control, uniformity,
and integration what Arnold Pacey calls the "virtuosity values" (p.
102). As a result, electronic communications are unreflectively trumped
as the technological sublime and invested with divine significance. In
its heaviest form, neutrality promotes a version of technological deter-
minism in which technology's own inner logic appears to drive its
development. This narrow view fosters the working rule that "If it can
be done, it should be," eradicating other significant dimensions from
decision-making.
The prevailing opinion that technology is neutral typically focuses
on hardware on tools and mechanical artifacts. That definition is
starkly deficient in scope compared to technology as a value-laden
human process. Technology is the distinct cultural activity in which
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human beings form and transform natural reality for practical ends.
Given this perspective, valuing penetrates all technological activity, from
the analytical framework used to understand technological issues, through
the processes of design and fabrication, to the resulting tools and
products. Although valuing surely involves the uses to which people put
these technological objects, valuing saturates every phase prior to usage
as well (Christians, 1989; Mosma, 1984).
There can be no isolated, neutral understanding of technology as
though it exists in a presuppositionless vacuum. Instead, technology
proceeds out of the whole of human experience and is directed by
ultimate human commitments. Technology is value-laden, the product
of the primordial valuing activities of humankind. It not only arises as
technology interacts with political and social factors, but also emerges
from the basic fact that technological objects are unique, not universal.
Technological products are particular. They combine specific re-
sources into distinctive entities with unique properties and capabilities.
. Technological objects embody decisions to develop one kind of knowl-
edge and not another, to use certain resources and not others, to use
energy of a specific form and quantity and not some other. There is no
^ purely neutral rationale for all these decisions. Instead, they arise from
conceptions of the world related to such issues as permissible uses, good
stewardship, and justice.
Contrary to slogans, technological objects do impose on users the
way they can be used. Clearly there is latitude in function, but never
complete freedom. Advances in medical technology, for example, con-
dition medical practice. A simple tool such as a can opener must be
used in a certain way to be effective. Air travel opens up several options
but closes others, such as schedule and destination flexibility or the
chance simply to stop and enjoy the scenery. The unique entity called
the computer embodies specific capabilities and restrictions which ho-
mogenize the heterogeneous; it classifies according to its own internal
rules. One's available choices are never randomly susceptible to unlimited
genius, but depend on the regimen of technology's structure.
The Frankfurt School, from Herbert Marcuse to Jurgen Habermas,
has demonstrated compellingly that modern technology, far from being
neutral, embodies values incompatible with democracy's core values and
operational demands. Martin Heidegger's (1977) seminal essay, "What
is Technology," establishes in the existentialist mode that a technological
society is at odds with human freedom. And Jacques Ellul (1969a)
develops these ruminations into a full-scale critique, demonstrating that
technology's efficiency breeds a climate of amorality.
In Ellul's view, industrialized civilizations have their own recogniz-
able "Geist" or characteristic consciousness which he calls la technique.
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This ethos of efficiency appears everywhere, fully as important to wheat
farmers and napalm companies as to communication engineers searching
out a channel capacity of one billion bits per second to replace our
present 600,000. "Whatever the diversity of countries and methods,
they have one characteristic in common: Concern with effective-
ness. . . . This is the supreme law which must never be forgotten" (p.
x). Ellul exhaustively portrays one thesis: We are so beguiled by machine
productivity that we almost unconsciously reconstruct all our social
institutions on this model.
Society has entered a new moral posture, designed "to bring human
behavior into harmony with the technicized world, to set up a new scale
of values in terms of 'la technique'
"
(Ellul, 1969b, p. 184). Moral
values are thus precluded, since la technique and judgments about
Tightness or wrongness are mutually exclusive. La technique acts tyran-
nically as "a spiritual guillotine, decapitating other values, depriving
them of social power" (Shriver, 1972, p. 537). A civilization engrossed
in means eliminates all moral obstructions to its ascendancy, as "in
ancient days men put out the eyes of nightingales in order to make
them sing better" (Ellul, 1967, p. 75). Moral judgment lies ruined
within the ashes of a meansined civilization. An ethic of efficiency
replaces moral goods with averages and probabilities mathematically
computed.
Certainly, political and business structures are ravaged by the spirit
of machineness, but the situation is doubly ruinous with regard to
communications. As the media sketch out one's world, determine one's
conversations, and shape one's decisions and self-identity, they foster in
the Western soul a technicized view of life. If the burgeoning state and
industrial order are la technique's supreme embodiments, our commu-
nication systems are its "innermost, and most elusive, manifestation"
(Ellul, 1969a, p. xvii). The media are the means to prevent increasing
technique "from being felt as too oppressive and to persuade men to
submit with good grace" (p. xviii). The devastating invasion of democ-
racy's lifeblood results in people welcoming with enthusiasm the very
mechanized constraints which rob them of their freedom. The infor-
mation system stands powerless with respect to the efficiency motif, but
instead subtly adjusts the citizenry to accept it, even to welcome it
eagerly. A surfeit of data, far from permitting people to make judgments ^
and form opinions, actually paralyzes them.
Ultimate triumph is sought almost invariably in more streamlined
methods, faster computer banks, complex multivariate scales, and elec-
tronic consoles of unlimited news and entertainment. Moral purpose is v
sacrificed to technological excellence. Thus, once the printing press was
invented, a process was set in motion for constantly increasing its
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capacity, speeding its production, and refining it organizationally. Obey-
ing the same autonomous development, electronics is expanded from
Atlantic cable to communication satellites, from seven TV channels to
thirty, from specialized companies to multi-national conglomerates. And
there is a failure to recognize that this self-augmenting process is alien
;j to moral imperatives. Thus the conundrum: Whatever is gained in
transmission is lost in ethics. In the process of fabricating expert
/ mechanical systems, the world is sanitized of moral imperatives. Efficiency
and morality are polar opposites, in fact, a contradiction in terms.
The stouthearted must hasten to the philosophical trenches. What
could normativity possibly mean in an amoral age? Recovering the idea
of norms is the catalyst for an authoritative information ethics in a
global context. The debate in metaethics over the nature of norms is
the open door through which a significant ethics can advance.
In contemporary parlance, one must decenter the concept of
normativity; this long way around is the best path home. As Hans Jonas
(1984) writes:
The very same movement which put us in possession of the powers
that we now have to be regulated by norms the movement of
modern knowledge called science has by a necessary complemen-
tarity eroded the foundations from which norms are derived; it has
destroyed the very idea of norm as such. (p. 22)
This is the conundrum in its starkest terms. Global realities demand
global communications. The human race cannot be stitched together
effectively by politics or transnational economics. Information is a social
necessity for the modern planetary system, but as the system is expanded,
its content thickened, and its transmission speeded up, a normative base
is being undermined which is needed now more than ever, given the
complexities of a global technological civilization. Society is increasingly
trapped in Kurt Vonnegut's conundrum: As he reaches into his repertoire
of commitments, wisdom, and intelligence, he comes up emptyhanded
precisely at the moment he needed them most (Vonnegut, 1952).
In a medieval fable, a dragon is urgently summoned to defend a
castle. He pulls together his mighty frame and reaches deep inside for
a torrent of fire to scorch the attackers. Nothing happens. The flames
in his stomach have died. At the moment of challenge, he becomes
little more than a puffing hulk with his fire gone out.
Today, when the demands are most intense, the great information
enterprise rouses itself for battle. Ethics committees crop up in profes-
sional associations. Alarmists demand more responsible performance.
Books and magazines appear on professional virtue, decency, primefade
duties, and compassion. The dragon is rumbling, heaving, and puffing
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but the fire has died. At the critical moment, instead of roaring flames,
the blaze inside has sputtered out.
Analogously, the long-burning fires of normative thinking are
flickering down. At the point where a definitive axiology is most needed
for confronting the rage outside, its fundamental inspiration falls away.
Princ^piai foundations were designed in a secure Newtonian world with
more settled meanings. Now the Enlightenment world view has collapsed,
its view of rational being assaulted by Freud and its static universe
destroyed by Darwin. The stakes have escalated, the whirlwind is here,
and the storm is confronted without a solid theoretical mooring. Ob-
viously, it is foolish to look for a quick fix and unacceptable to hide
under fancy rhetoric. But the normativity domain can still be worked
as an act of conscience, driven by the need for a vantage point from
which to evaluate, judge, and reconstruct all phases of professional
morality.
PARADOX
Unfortunately, this dualism and conundrum are exacerbated by a
paradox. Norms must be imbedded within culture and history. With
this intellectual strategy, transcendental criteria are shifted from a
metaphysical, vertical, punctiliar plane to the horizon of community,
world, and being; but norms with abiding power they remain, none-
theless. In this view, cultures are sets of symbols that organize the human
kingdom and are, therefore, ipso facto evaluative. Societies are embod-
iments of institutions, practices, and structures recognized internally as
legitimate. Without allegiance to a web of ordering relations, society
becomes inconceivable. A culture's continued existence depends on
identifying and defending its normative base. And such a framing of
human identity can only be rooted in a proto-norm of universal solidarity.
Helmut Peukert (1981) properly insists on universal humanness as the
basic principle of ethics and the epicenter of all communication (p. 11).
Refusing to confront normative issues on every level weakens the
agenda of universal humanness. How can one legitimately appeal to the
supreme value of human life, to an affirmation of unmitigated human
dignity, without accepting a network of primal norms justice, com-
passion, reciprocity, stewardship that are nonnegotiable? Everything
else comes and goes, both ideologies and the cultures they sustain. If
temporality exhausts one's intellectual vistas, wherein lies the possibility
of justifying an ethics of human mutuality in the face of anarchy,
dialecticism, or equivocation? Without norms that are more than con-
tingent, one cannot finally condemn oppression and dehumanization
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except on the grounds of personal prejudice or emotional makeup.
Absent a defensible conception of the good, praxis will be vitiated by
arbitrariness. In fact, without a commitment to norms, an emancipatory
intention is radicallyjeopardized and the byproduct is moral agnosticism.
As Basil Mitchell (1980) maintains, the cultural ethos can be decisive
without being exclusive. Determinate human beings are not dissolved
in a sea of cultural history.
The debate centers, of course, on a philosophy of history. A cultural
history with an anthropological bearing predicates an understanding of
history in which universals are the problematic and the radically human
is epicenter. This is a theory of culture which privileges the human, and
in so doing rests on unresolved arguments. If, for example, we maintain
one another as humans only in culture, how is it logically possible that
humans who themselves are constituted by culture could fully explain
the process by which they are enabled to do the explaining? It is an old
dilemma in new clothes: Can a theory of something contain itself? As
semiotics teaches, there is not the self and language, but one is ultimately
inextricable from the other, the first but a manifestation of the second.
As one comprehends culture and its catalytic agent, communication,
one thereby makes ontological claims about human being.
But that very conundrum contends for history as a normed process.
To establish a transformational ethics, it is necessary to articulate an
understanding of human being. And any such attribution, no matter
how unintended, carries with it one's moral complicity because beingness
is conditioned by the language concerning it. Culture encapsulates what
humanity values; but undeveloped, that remains only an opening ap-
proximation. Universal claims have worked themselves into historical
time. No society, as far as is known, has ever declared open hunting
season on humans; that is, none exists where three people can be shot
during October. All people create life under the presumption of re-
sponsibility for those conceived. As a sign of distinctive humanness, one
generates symbolic patterns along the boundaries between moral norms
and actual behavior, the deepest self and one's collective role, the
intentional and the inevitable. There are epiphanal moments suspended
outside of oneself, and one can identify them and believe them to be
true. The very possibility of universal norms forces a choice among
options conducive to universal solidarity. In an ironic twist on conven-
tional skepticism, history as a normed process is not an ancient remnant
but the catalyst for conceptual innovation.
The paradox should be evident. In a post-Newtonian, counter-
Enlightenment age, norms can only be recovered culturally, can only
be situated in history. They are apprehended in locis, yet universal proto-
norms beyond region and language are essential to maintaining human
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societies and preventing anti-cultural directions in our indigenous insti-
tutions. Master-norms are of the first order, conceptually speaking, yet
human beings enter them only through that second-order reality known
as ethnicity, geography, and ideology. The first and second orders are
distinguished as with a windowpane knowing there is a decisive break,
yet both realms are transparent to each other as well.
In April 1989, the author joined twenty-five others from around
the globe in Geneva at the United Nations. The group debated the
1948 Human Rights Declaration that ingenious appeal to universal
human dignity which has survived forty years with surprising resilience.
The group worked to solidify it ethically and conceptually for a new
worldwide thrust, each group member arrogant enough to speak on
behalf of an entire nation.
In October of 1989, in Rizal outside Manila, the author toured a
harbor in a small fishing boat, observing how international fisheries had
fenced off the productive areas for themselves and destroyed for Filipino
subsistence fishermen the meager existence which at least had kept them
from starving to death. Through People in Communications, these
fishermen were gaining a voice, producing pamphlets, drawing cartoons,
holding town meetings, shooting eight-minute videos hoping to gain
a hearing in the capital city where they had no access before. As they
presented their case in a small room of a cement-block building, they
sounded like the Geneva debates in miniature. The Rizal fishermen
appealed for minimal justice; they defied those who did not merely steal
their fish but stripped away their rights and dignity. And along the
chocolate waters of Rizal Bay rather than the splashing fountains of
Geneva, the temporary structure rather than the marble Palace of the
Nations, the wooden fishing boats of Asia rather than the chauffeured
limousines of Europe, the broken English of October 14 rather than
the streamlined electronic translations of April 14, proto-norms were
being fashioned incarnate in history.
Yet, without the universal, international mode, there is no oppor-
tunity to protect the environment, prevent economic bankruptcy, control
dizzying population growth, or reduce the weapons of global destruction.
Those who plead for preserving local cultures and those envisioning a
global information order are both right. However, these are parallel
movements, interconnected in a way that makes folklore from the
ground up the sine qua non for universal norms rooted in our solidarity
as a human race. Thus the paradox: In pursuing high technology as
the sinews which bind humanity together, the impassioned need for
cultural diversity must be nurtured as well. In the absence of empowering ) "V
indigenous groups, an elitist, paternalistic system is created at odds with
the very social ethics constructed in its name.
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At his Guildhall lecture in London in the summer of 1989, Ronald
Reagan used the upheaval in China and its vicious repression to celebrate
freedom. "You cannot massacre an idea," he said. "You cannot run
tanks over hope. You cannot riddle people's yearning with bullets"
(Broder, 1989, p. 13).
Mr. Reagan was undoubtedly correct. But he ignored the paradox
as he doomed tyranny through the communications revolution. "The
biggest of Big Brothers is helpless," he insisted, "against the technology
of the information age. Electronic beams blow through the Iron Curtain
as if it were lace" (p. 13). But this is not so. Even in open societies,
local histories resist intrusion from an anonymous messenger (Broder,
1989). Until symbols resonate from the ground up, the free flow of
V
^
information remains alien and amorphous. All the sophistication used
in negotiating a new world information order between New York City
!
v
/ and Mexico City, London and New Delhi, Paris and Caracas, ought to
concern itself intraculturally, be it in the villages, between Bangkok and
the remote people groups in the mountains, or among a burgeoning
ethnic diversity here in the United States.
An assumption of this paper is the elementary distinction between
cultural and ethical relativism the contention that cultural divergence
is a source of convergence ethically. The cheerful relativists cannot
escape Mannheim's paradox:
Truth, the relativists say, is culture-bound. But if it were, then they,
within their own culture, ought not to see their own culture-bound
truth as absolute. They cannot proclaim cultural relativism without
rising above it, and they cannot rise above it without giving it up.
(Quine, 1975, pp. 327-28)
Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1955), the German ethicist martyred in one
of Hitler's concentration camps, challenges the reader to keep his or
her penultimate concerns from becoming ultimate. He understood them
to be organically unified as a whole, just as the Filipino fisherman's
insistence on dignity is a universal truth. Cut loose from the ultimate,
penultimate concerns are merely self-serving; substituted for the ultimate
domain, they become a strident claim at the expense of another's dignity,
a plea for justice now transformed into an abrogation of other moral
obligations.
CONCLUSION
Technological civilization is grounded in a duality that often mal-
functions. Global media for understanding is in conjugant relationship
with instruments of annihilation, the tools for peace themselves solidi-
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fying a technological order that makes principial claims alien intruders.
This technological order is itself confronted by a conundrum and a
paradox, the conundrum being the loss of normativity abetted by the
very tools required for any semblance of interconnection on a worldwide
scale. Paradoxically, the norms which need recovering are appropriate
indigenously but must function universally. Perhaps this duality, conun-
drum, and paradox can be connected through Ronald Sider's (1979,
pp. 203-04) story of Dailyville.
In this story, a small town is surrounded by mountains. A steep and
winding highway is its only entrance, and many are injured or die
coming down the dangerous road. The good people of the village
provide a volunteer ambulance service and maintain an efficient hospital
twenty-four hours a day. Then an engineer discovers a likely opening
for a short tunnel and everyone applauds the idea. But the local
Rockefeller owns a service station along the mountain route, and the
mayor has a prosperous restaurant halfway down. Soon, the villagers
begin doubting the cost estimates for the new tunnel, and a few harass
the idea as too visionary. So, to this day, ambulances continue to scream
up the road and medical supplies at the Dailyville hospital are fully
stocked. The emergency crews vote badges and honors to one another
for a job well done.
A theory of normative ethics proposes to dig a tunnel through the
mountain. Instead of bandages and antiseptic on the wounds, structural
changes are needed in our world view, fundamental transformations in
the way information institutions function. Putting this thesis in its most
innocuous form: Substantive advance in information ethics depends on
validating the idea of normativity as a necessary though insufficient
condition. Discussion of ethics is merely an ideological exercise in the
absence of normative criteria. While making norms philosophically
unassailable may be impossible, a discourse is needed in which norma-
tivity as a minimum becomes herausforderend in Heidegger's terms
pressing itself upon us with compelling force. Only when students of
information ethics see normativity as herausforderend will the research
and writing of information professionals be of enduring significance.
While the profession is busy hammering out more ethical practices
and siding with those oppressed or cheated by the system, it must
continue to raise a prophetic voice on behalf of the tunnel. Research
libraries should be ransacked for the great debates over absolutes, and
those serious recent attempts to recover the idea of normativity read,
e.g., Hans Jonas' (1984) The Imperative of Responsibility, Thomas Nagel's
(1986) View from Nowhere, Michael Polanyi's (1966) The Tacit Dimension,
and Frederick Will's (1988) Beyond Deduction.
Human reality is structured by ideas. In Heidegger's profound
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sense, we live in the house of language. Our presuppositions are the
grid through which we view the world and act upon it. As we participate
in the common task of generating a normative discourse, we contribute
to the first-order domain of proto-norms and thereby make possible a
meaningful second-order entree to this arena. Providentially, interstices
or open spaces still exist in the pointillist canvas called technological
civilization. While pure, universal truth is never encountered, attending
this territory gives one continuity over space and across time. At least
phenomenologically speaking, working on norms enables one to integrate
a duality, turn a conundrum into an inspiration, and reconceive a
paradox into a mandate for thinking globally while making a difference
locally.
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